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 Risk and uncertainty
I Farmers and consumers rely on uncertain/unpredictable nature
I They face risks of ill-being (bankruptcy / food shortage)
because of this  presumably growing larger with climatic
change
I We analysts are uncertain with respect to how much the risks
grow
I Unless our uncertainties are modeled and quantiﬁed in
appropriate ways joint with those of producers and consumers,
we will almost certainly give wrong advice
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 General equilibrium models
I General equilibrium models (GE) (Arrow and Debreu) tend to
be large, complex and breathtakingly impressive (CAPRI,
GTAP, MAGPIE etc).
I Despite this, all issues on uncertainty and risk are left outside
the model  with the assumption that all possible future
events can be insured and need not be considered.
I Basically, the assumption on insurance is false. Making
insurance markets work is costly. An inﬁnite number of such
markets are required
I An alternative (Radner 1972) is to specify a few insurance
markets: general equilibrium with incomplete asset markets
(GEI)
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 A case
I A tribe farms by making eﬀorts, x , on their land and reaping
their crops, y , according to what nature, w , allows. The crop
model, y = F (x ,w), is known and invariant, but the outcome
of nature is known only by its invariant probability distribution,
pi(w).
I A utility function, U(x , y), measures the well-being of the tribe
in a single year
I The chief decides a strategy with respect to eﬀort, x∗,
depending on the model he leans on, static GE or stochastic
dynamic GEI
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 Making the case more realistic
I The tribe may ﬁnd ways to store crops from one year to the
next: Barns and/or livestock
I The tribe may trade with other tribes forming markets at
certain points in time
I Tribes may specialize in wage labor or production management
according to endowments and resources
I Markets for insurance contracts can be formed to spread risk
I Groups of tribes form nations and a modern world is created
I but none of these modiﬁcations change the fundamental
contrasts between GE and GEI
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 The case with static GE model
I The maximum well-being of the tribe is given by a value
function
U∗(w) = max
x
U(x ,F (x ,w))
I The optimal eﬀort taking w as given:
x∗(w) = argmaxx {U(x ,F (x ,w))}
I The marginal eﬀect of nature on well-being is given by
derivative of the value function (envelope theorem):
∂wU
∗(w) = ∂yU(x∗,F (x∗,w))∂wF (x∗,w)
The dependence of x∗ on w plays no role for the marginal
eﬀect
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 The case with stochastic dynamic GEI model
I The value function is now an expected present well-being
taking all possible states in all future into account
U∗(y , pi) = max
x
{U(x , y) + βEpi(w) U∗(F (x ,w), pi)}
where the expectation is taken over nature next year
I The optimal eﬀort taking y and pi as given:
x∗(y , pi) = argmaxx
{
U(x , y) + βEpi(w) U
∗(F (x ,w), pi)
}
I The marginal eﬀect of a change in the probability distribution
of nature on well-being can be calculated
∂piU
∗(y , pi) = β∂piEpi(w) U∗(F (x ,w), pi)
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 Uncertainty of the analyst (all model types)
I The analyst may be uncertain about which nature, probability
distribution, crop model and utility function have been applied.
I He should then form an ensemble of value functions, U∗k ,
k = 1, . . . ,K , with probabilities, Pk
EU∗ =
∑
PkU
∗
k
I and measure the marginal eﬀect of a changed natural
environment as a derivative of the ensemble value function:
∂EU∗ =
∑
Pk∂U
∗
k
I Ensemble prediction of nature, ensemble crop model and
ensemble utility function play no role alone
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 Conclusions
I GE models
I treat only food supply and demand deterministically
I what agricultural economics to large extent is stuck to
I structural simplicity is "compensated" with high resolutions
over space and commodities (and eventually between-year
time)
I GEI models
I may deal with probabilities that nature is unfavorable over
large parts of the world over long time
I what research on food security needs, and what modern macro
and resource economics is about
I more diﬃcult than GE models. Diﬀerential equations need be
solved  approximately
I the big picture can presumably be painted with relatively low
resolutions over within-year time, between-year time, space,
commodities and states of nature
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 Thanks for your attention
